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Abstract 
We investigate the effect of national culture on women manager appointments. We argue that 
culture influences women manager appointments through their effects on managerial decision-
making. Using firm-level data on 2456 microfinance institutions (MFIs) across 61 countries, 
we document that fewer women managers are appointed in societies high on individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance. On the contrary, high power distance societies are positively associated 
with the appointment of women managers. We demonstrate that a greater number of women 
non-managers reduces (increases) the appointment of women managers in high individualistic 
(uncertainty avoidance) cultures. Our findings challenge the “one size fit all” approach adopted 
by policymakers around the world to increase women manager appointments. Our results are 
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Given global concerns about the underrepresentation of women at higher levels in 
organisations, a large stream of literature has examined job inequalities and labour market 
discrimination against women. Typically, these studies focus on establishing the existence or 
the prevalence of the discrimination against women and thus assume that their evidence would 
trigger policy responses to redress the situation (Reskin, 2000). Nevertheless, little is known 
about the causes of workplace discrimination against women1. This may be partly due to the 
difficulty involved in predicting the causes of human behaviour, actions and intentions (Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 1969; Ajzen & Madden, 1985). Recently, however, some scholars have echoed the 
need for gender diversity studies to consider the causes of gender stereotyping and workplace 
discrimination against women (Gyapong et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2014; Saeed et al., 2016; Saeed 
& Sameer, 2017). We investigate how national culture2 affects managerial gender diversity. 
 We are motivated to focus on national culture and managerial gender diversity due to 
the following broad considerations. The paucity of women in managerial positions is 
influenced by the supply and demand for women managers. From the supply side, social role 
theory suggests that society ascribes different characteristics across sexes and this leads to men 
and women occupying different roles in society (Eagly & Wood, 1999). Stereotypically, 
women are thus classified as having attributes that make them unsuitable for managerial roles 
but suitable for caretaking roles (Chizema et al., 2015; Eagly & Wood, 2012). Furthermore, 
culture has been used to legitimize violence against women (Krob & Steffen, 2015; Nayak et 
al., 2003; Rimonte, 1991). In fact, prior literature suggests that women in Asian and Middle 
Eastern communities believe that it is culturally acceptable for women to be disciplined by men 
if they do not stay within their prescribed gender roles (Huisman 1996; Raj & Silverman, 
2002;Song, 1996). Consequently, women in societies with cultures that legitimize gender 
stereotypes may be less likely to take up managerial roles.  
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On the demand side, culture affects the demand for women managers by influencing 
the way people think, feel and act (Kluckholn, 1951). Culture affects the behaviour and 
motivation of individuals so that differences in cultures explain the different construal people 
have about others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 2010; Strandell, 2016). It influences the various 
decisions people make (Marcen, 2014). Accordingly, existing studies suggest that culture 
affects managerial decisions associated with capital structure (Li et al., 2011), corporate 
governance (Chan & Cheung, 2012), risk (Li et al., 2013), and software piracy (Husted, 2000). 
We hypothesise that culture affects hiring managers’ decision to appoint women managers.  
The article uses data on microfinance institutions (MFIs). Although MFIs are an 
unusual context (Bamberger & Pratt, 2010), they provide an interesting setting for addressing 
issues relating to national culture and women manager appointments. First, microfinance is a 
business for women (Strom, et al., 2014). In terms of client base, the mission orientation of 
MFIs is such that they mainly depend on women borrowers (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). 
This is because MFIs specialise in the provision of financial services to the informal sectors 
which are mainly women-dominated (Strom et al., 2014; Tchuigoua, 2016). In fact, women are 
the beneficiaries of more than seventy percent of loans granted by MFIs (Daley-Harris, 2009; 
Sanyal, 2009). Further, in terms of managers, women managers in MFIs is high relative to 
traditional firms. For example, although Iskenderian (2011) report a decreasing trend in women 
in top positions in MFIs, Strom et al. (2015) report that 29% of board seats in MFIs are still 
held by women. In contrast, in traditional firms, women directors constitute only 10.2% of total 
board seats in China (Liu et al., 2014) and 8.8% in the USA (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). The 
centrality of women in the microfinance industry makes it imperative to examine women-
related issues in MFIs. 
Second, MFIs are mainly located in developing countries (Tchuigoua, 2016) where 
culture is imbued in religion, fatalism, and ethnicity (Mendonca & Kanungo, 1996). 
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Consequently, in these countries, cultural perceptions permeate the entire fabric of life, 
including decisions to seek ante-natal care (Simkhada et al., 2008), and even treatment for 
certain ailments (Patcher, 1994). There is also evidence that culture affects CSR priorities in 
developing countries (Visser, 2008). It is thus delusional to think that in these countries, “when 
employees arrive at work they can or should leave at the point of entry their cultural baggage, 
and pick it up at the end of the workday for use in their non-work life and non-work activities” 
(Mendonca & Kanungo, 1996, p.67). The extreme cultural influence in the countries where 
MFIs are mainly located “allows us to capture constructs and relationships that may be too 
weak to notice or capture in traditional settings” (Bamberger & Pratt, 2010, p 668). 
Using a sample of 2456 MFIs across 61 countries, we document that national culture 
(as captured by Hofstede, 1984; 2001; Hofstede et al., 2010) influences managerial gender 
diversity. Specifically, the results show that MFIs in countries that are high on uncertainty 
avoidance and individualism appoint fewer women managers. Conversely, MFIs in high power 
distance countries appoint more women managers. Further analysis reveals that MFIs in 
societies high on individualism and power distance appoint fewer women into non-managerial 
positions.  In contrast, more women non-managers are appointed in high masculine cultures. 
Also, consistent with the glass ceiling hypothesis, increasing the number of women non-
managers reduces the number of women managers in high individualistic countries. However, 
appointing more women non-managers increases women manager appointments in countries 
that are high on uncertainty avoidance and power distance. These findings probe the boundaries 
of the glass ceiling hypothesis and suggest that increasing women presence in non-managerial 
roles increases (reduces) glass ceiling in high individualistic (uncertainty avoidance) countries.  
The study offers several contributions to the literature. First, despite the recent surge in 
gender diversity literature, studies that focus on the financial sector mainly examine the 
consequences of gender diversity. These studies primarily examine the effects of women 
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managers/directors on bank-level attributes such as CEO compensation (Owen et al., 2018), 
financial fragility (Farag & Mallin, 2017), performance (Owen & Temesvary, 2018) and capital 
structure (Adusei & Obeng, 2019). Our study is different because it focuses on the causes (not 
effects) of women manager appointments in the financial sector. More importantly, we focus 
on MFIs, which despite their importance (especially in developing countries) have escaped the 
attention of researchers in this area. Second, in contrast to prior single country studies, we use 
data on 2456 MFIs across 61 countries. This is necessary to capture salient institutional 
diversity around the world (Chizema et al., 2015) and augurs well for generalizations.   
 Third, we empirically link culture to managerial gender diversity. We, therefore, 
contribute to the literature by documenting that differences in the level of workplace gender 
diversity, as well as women manager appointments across countries, can be explained by 
national culture. Lastly, from a policy perspective, our results challenge the existing “one size 
fits all” approach adopted globally to increase the number of women in higher positions.  For 
example, our results show that, whereas appointing more women non-managers reduces the 
appointment of women managers in countries that are high on individualism, it leads to the 
appointment of more women managers in high uncertainty avoidance and power distance 
countries. Impliedly, policies aimed at reducing workplace gender homogeneity should also 
consider national culture.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework whilst literature review and hypotheses are presented in section 3. We present the 
data and methods in section 4. The results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents further 
analysis. We conduct robustness tests in section 7. We discuss the results, limitations and future 
directions in section 8. Section 9 concludes the article.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
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Social Role Theory  
Social role theory (SRT) offers one of the most convincing explanations for workplace gender 
homogeneity. According to SRT, different characteristics exist across sexes and this leads to 
men and women occupying different roles in society (Eagly & Wood, 1999).  Society 
establishes a sexual division of labour where productive activities are solely carried out by one 
sex (Eagly et al., 2000: Murdock & Provost, 1973). That is, “feminine behaviours prevail in 
social situations and masculine behaviours in work situations” (Yockey, 1978 p. 917). Social 
role theory suggests that culturally, men are expected to be “breadwinners” and women 
“homemakers” (Eagly & Wood, 1999). Accordingly, these culturally differentiated roles result 
in sex-differentiated preferences for long-term partners where men seek women who are likely 
to be successful in the domestic role while women seek men who have the potential to succeed 
economically (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Johannesen-Schmidt & Eagly, 2002). 
SRT ascribes communal and agentic attributes to sexes (Eagly, 1987, Koenig, et al., 
2011). The communal feature is ascribed to women and pertains to a notorious concern for 
others and manifests through a demonstration of affection, empathy, and a concern for the 
welfare of others (Chizema et al., 2015; Eagly & Karau, 2002). These stereotypes lead to a 
heightened societal expectation that occupations such as nursing and social work should be 
women-dominated (Eagly et al., 2000). In contrast, agentic features such as assertiveness and 
confidence are ascribed to men (Eagly & Karau, 2002). However, to the extent that “there are 
no sex differences in cognitive abilities” (Hakim, 2006 p. 279), the stereotypical ascription of 
communal and agentic attributes makes it atypical for women to exhibit traits required to 
succeed in male-dominated occupations. For example, existing studies Chizema et al. (2015) 
suggest that relative to the agentic features attributed to men, the communal attributes ascribed 
to women are less valuable in the labour market. Consequently, women who find themselves 
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in societies with a cultural orientation that accept inequalities may aspire less to get into 
managerial roles. 
 
Other Supporting Theories 
Attribution theory and prototypicality (inferential observer processes) (Elgar, 2016; Jacquart 
& Antonakis, 2015; Martinko et al., 2007) may also explain the incidence of women 
advancement at the workplace. Attribution theory suggests that “attributions are the results of 
the fundamental cognitive processes by which people ascertain cause and effect so that they 
can solve problems and become more efficacious in their interactions with their environment” 
(Martinko et al., 2007, p. 562). When applied to manager appointments, performance is thought 
to be an indicator of a manager’s competence and effectiveness (Calder, 1977; Jacquart & 
Antonakis, 2015). Consequently, managers get a positive evaluation and a reappointment if 
good performance is attributed to them or replaced if poor performances are attributed them.  
More so, prototypicality refers to “peoples’ judgment” about the extent to which 
“attributes fit with categories” (Lord et al., 1984). That is, people have a deducible prototype 
of a manager or leader (Antonakis et al., 2011) and those who exhibit traits that fit this 
prototype are viewed favourably for managerial positions. Accordingly, existing studies 
suggest that height (Gladwell, 2005) and age (Elgar, 2016; Rosing et al., 2011) are important 
for a manager prototype. Similarly, Jacquart and Antonakis (2015) suggest that people with 
charisma typify the prototypicality that followers seek.  
From attribution theory perspective, women may only be appointed into managerial 
positions if good performance is attributed to them (Brancato & Patterson, 1999). Nevertheless, 
empirical studies attempting to link women managers to firm performance have only produced 
mixed results (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Liu et al., 2014; Ntim, 2015; Smith et al., 2006). There 
is also evidence that no single theory directly predicts the nature of the relationship between 
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women managers and performance (Carter et al., 2010).  Clearly, the link between women 
managers and performance remains ambiguous. However, Jacquart and Antonakis (2015) 
propose an attributional ambiguity theory of managerial selection. They suggest that 
prototypicality (inferential observer processes) will matter more to selectors in the presence of 
attributional ambiguity. Thus, due to the prevalence of attributional ambiguity surrounding the 
women manager-performance nexus, prototypicality (rather than attribution) will be 
instrumental in women manager selection. Nevertheless, prototypical views are shaped by 
society in the way espoused by SRT (Abrams & Hogg, 2010; Goldman & Hogg, 2016; Hogg, 
2005; Isenberg, 1986). Prototypicality is a function of SRT—people in societies that believe in 
the sexual division of labour where productive activities are ascribed to men (Eagly & Wood, 
1999) are likely to view the male gender as a manager prototype. Consequently, although 
prototypicality offers some insights into women manager selection the theoretical framing and 
hypotheses development are grounded in SRT. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
National Culture and Women Managers 
Smith (1997) defines culture as a “myriad ways of living exhibited by a particular group of 
people, ways that are transmitted from one generation to the next and which distinguish that 
group from others” (as quoted in Yates & Oliveira, 2016). It is a system of fixed values and 
beliefs that are fairly transmitted from generation to generations (Guiso et al., 2006). Culture 
affects how people make decisions (Yates & Oliveira, 2016). We argue that decisions regarding 
the extent to which productive activities are solely carried out by one sex may be greatly 
influenced by culture. 
Strandell (2016) suggests that culture explains the differences in construal that people 
have about themselves and others. Arguably, culture will affect how people form implicit 
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prototypes of managers. This is because SRT ascribes “homemaker” and “breadwinner” roles 
to women and men respectively (Eagly & Wood, 1999). Therefore, in cultures that encourage 
(discourage) this sexual division of labour, selectors may be uncooperative (corporative) to the 
appointment of women managers. Culture may also indirectly affect women manager 
appointment by altering how women exhibit traits of a prototype manager. For example, 
Jacquart and Antonakis (2015) suggest that charisma is important for managerial prototype. 
Charismatic managers mirror the prototypicality that people seek (Hogg, 2001). In line with 
this, existing literature emphasizes the importance of charisma in assessing peoples’ capacity 
for managerial roles (Judge & Picolo, 2004; Steffens et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2011). However, 
charisma involves being exceptionally expressive (Gardner & Avolio, 1998; Jacquart & 
Antonakis, 2015) as well as the ability to challenge the status quo (Conger & Kanungo, 1987). 
Consequently, in societies with culture (such as high power distance) that forbid women to be 
expressive and challenge the status quo, women are unable to exhibit charisma and are less 
likely to be viewed favourably as manager prototype. 
Eagly et al. (2002) argue that the existence of status and power in societies typically 
favour men. We argue that the pervasiveness of such unequal distribution of power and status 
in favour of men will be influenced by the prevailing culture in that society. Cultural orientation 
that favours inequality may legitimize and reinforce the inferior status ascribed to women and 
thus prevent them from assuming managerial roles. In contrast, stereotypes against women may 
wane in cultures that frown on inequalities and thus allow more women into managerial 
positions. 
 
 Hypotheses Development 
Prior national culture-related studies have employed one of the Hofstede cultural framework 
(Hofstede, 1980) and the GLOBE cultural measures (House et al., 2004). Relative to the 
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Hofstede framework, the GLOBE cultural measure is more recent and currently gaining 
popularity among contemporary researchers. Thus, a major caveat against the use of the 
Hofstede (1984) dimensions is the fact that situations might have changed and the framework 
may be unable to capture recent changes in national culture. However, Licht et al. (2007) note 
that changes in cultural values if any occur slowly over centuries. More so, because the 
Hofstede dimension scores represent relative positions with respect to other countries rather 
than an absolute position, a change in culture is unlikely to result in a change in these 
dimensions (Hofstede, 2001). This is corroborated by Tang and Koveos (2008) who indicated 
the stickiness of the Hofstede cultural dimensions over time. Indeed, the Hofstede dimensions 
are highly robust (Murphy, 1999) and have been widely replicated and validated in several 
studies (Flynn & Saladin, 2006; Hoppe, 1990; Sondergaard, 1994). Between the periods 1980 
to 2002, over 170 published studies had used the Hofstede cultural framework (Kirkman et al., 
2006). Relative to the GLOBE, the Hofstede framework is more familiar among researchers 
because it is intuitive, simpler (Hadwick, 2011) and able to capture national cultural differences 
whiles focusing on the universals of each culture that connect society (Song et al., 2018). 
Therefore, consistent with previous studies (Galego-Alvarez & Ortas, 2017; Graafland & 
Noorderhaven, 2018; Husted, 2000; Li et al., 2013; Song et al., 2018) we use the Hofstede 
cultural dimensions as proxies for national culture due to its wide acceptance and applications. 
The Hofstede (1984) framework originally uses a sample of IBM employees across 50 
countries to categorize national cultural traits into four different dimensions—power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. Later, two new dimensions namely: 
long-term orientation (Hofstede & Bond, 1988), and indulgence (Hofstede et al., 2010) were 
added. Nevertheless, the new dimensions have attracted severe criticisms. For example, Chorou 
et al. (2018) argued that the new dimensions were based on different sample coverage and are 
not comparable with the other four dimensions. Indeed, the new dimensions were only an 
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attempt to bring in an Eastern construct (Hadwick, 2011) and have neither integrated with the 
other four constructs nor understood the Eastern perspective (Fang, 2003). Eringa et al. (2015) 
reported that long-term orientation consists of many values that overlap with the original four 
dimensions. Accordingly, Yeh and Lawrence (1995) caution against using individualism and 
long-term orientation together due to the high similarity. Consequently, existing studies 
(Ashraf et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017; Ghoul & Zheng, 2016; Salzmann & Soypak, 2017) 
mainly concentrate on the original four dimensions. Thus, relying on insights from prior studies 
and to facilitate results comparability, we focus on the four dimensions (Uncertainty avoidance, 
Individualism, Masculinity and power distance) espoused in Hofstede (1984).  
 
Uncertainty avoidance (Uncert). Hofstede (1984) defined uncertainty avoidance 
(Uncert) as the degree to which members of society embrace ambiguity or uncertainty. In 
high Uncert societies, people are conservative, bent on upholding the status quo, and 
intolerant towards foreign or alien practices (Chan & Cheung, 2012). In contrast, weak 
Uncert societies tolerate deviant behaviours in a relaxed atmosphere where practice is more 
important than principles (Hofstede, 1984).  
Social role theory suggests a sexual division of labour and opines that men are expected 
to be involved in productive activities whilst women take care of the home (Eagly & Wood, 
1999). To reduce uncertainty or ambiguity, high Uncert societies rely on rigid rules and norms 
(Hofstede, 1997). People in High Uncert societies frown on ambiguity and are less likely to 
accept unknown situations (Husted, 2000). In fact, social role theory suggests that “perceivers” 
tend to have strong conformity to sex-typical behaviours because they often ask others for 
guidance in ambiguous situations (Eagly et al., 2000; Festinger, 1954). We argue that women 
in high uncertainty avoidance countries may conform to the sexual division of labour and refuse 
to offer themselves for managerial appointments because moving into managerial may be a 
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source of ambiguity. Further, within SRT, the male gender is viewed more favourably as a 
manager prototype because agentic features which are highly valued at the workplace are only 
ascribed to men (Chizema et al., 2015). Accordingly, Uncert may reduce women manager 
appointments by indirectly influencing selectors’ choice of a manager prototype. This is 
because appointing a woman manager when the female gender is viewed as an unfavourable 
manager prototype may represent ambiguity or uncertainty. Therefore, uncertainty avoidance 
may result in the appointment of fewer women managers because it amounts to a certain degree 
of ambiguity and creates uncertainty. We, therefore, hypothesise that 
H1: High uncertainty avoidance impacts negatively on the number of women managers. 
Individualism (Indiv) 
 
Individualism. Is concerned with a preference for a loosely knit society (Hofstede, 
1984). In contrast, collectivism refers to the degree of interdependence or the extent of close 
ties between individuals (Husted, 2000). Individualistic societies exhibit assertive and self-
orientated traits embedded in selfishness so that rules and principles that hinder self-interests 
are ignored (Priem & Shaffer, 2001). People from individualistic cultures place much emphasis 
on individual rights (Chan & Cheung, 2012). Individualists are egoistic and are less concerned 
with ethical issues that promote the well-being of others (Vitell et al., 2003).  Moreover, SRT 
consistently defines socially acceptable household responsibilities for women (Eagly & Wood, 
1999; Rao, 2012). Within SRT womanhood is synonymous with domesticity and societies 
expect women to focus on the home (Rao, 2012). This domesticity ideology also echoes the 
subordination of women to men (Jackson, 1998). Given these SRT postulations, vis-à-vis the 
self-centred nature of dominant males in individualistic societies (Chan & Chang, 2012), they 
may prioritize their advantageous societal ascriptions to the detriment of women (Triandis, 
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1989). Consequently, they will resist attempts to implement rules that further the advancement 
of women at the workplace leading to a reduction in the number of women managers. 
Triandis (1994) and Husted (2000) describe how national culture shapes social 
behaviours and preferences. They argue that social behaviour is a function of in-group norms 
in both collectivist and individualist cultures. “In individualist cultures, equity is preferred over 
equality, while in collectivist cultures, equity is preferred in dealing with outgroups only, but 
equality is preferred in dealing with the ingroup” (Husted, 2000 p. 203). Gender equity is about 
giving women whatever they need to enable them to compete, whilst gender equality is 
concerned with equal treatment for women so they can compete fairly (Halai, 2011; Kumar & 
Quisumbing, 2015). However, the global call for corporate gender diversity3 (Liu et al., 2014; 
Ntim, 2015) is premised on equality, not equity. This is because it aims at removing 
discriminatory impediments (such as glass ceiling) that hinder the advancement of women so 
that women can have the same chance as men in career progression (Carter et al., 2003; 
Gyapong et al., 2016). Accordingly, others including Adams and Ferreira (2009), Brancato and 
Patterson (1999), Liu et al. (2014) suggest that focusing the corporate gender diversity 
argument solely on equity will only result in tokenism. Therefore, to the extent that 
individualism is associated with equity and not equality, there will be fewer women managers 
in individualist societies. We, therefore, hypothesize that: 
H2: High individualism impacts negatively on the number of women managers. 
Masculinity (Masc) 
 
Masculinity.  Refers to the extent to which society has a preference for “achievement 
and material success” (Hofstede, 1984). In contrast, femininity is concerned with the care and 
quality of life (Husted, 2000). “Masculinity” and “femininity” are not in reference to the male 
and female gender because males can be feminine just as females can be masculine (Hofstede, 
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1984). This view is synonymous with the social psychology literature that suggests that both 
men and women can be masculine, feminine or androgynous (Bem, 1977; O’Connor & Brown, 
2016; Robbins et al., 2001).  
Men in feminine countries are as caring as women (Hofstede, 2011). Femininity 
emphasizes corporation, consensus building and equality for both men and women (Hofstede, 
et al., 2010). Arguably, there will be less workplace gender discrimination in high feminine 
societies. In contrast, women in masculine countries are not as assertive and competitive as 
men (Hofstede, 2011). Consequently, men in masculine societies are given outgoing and 
assertive roles whilst nurturing and caring roles are ascribed to women (Hofstede, 1984).  For 
example, Hofstede (2011) notes that few women are elected into political positions in 
masculine countries. This is also consistent with the social role theory’s prescription of agentic 
and communal features for men and women respectively (Eagly & Wood, 1999; Koenig et al., 
2011). Feminine features which are similar to the communal attributes stereotypically ascribed 
to women are less valuable in labour markets (Chizema et al., 2015; Kilbourne & England, 
1996). We argue that institutions in masculine societies are likely to be male-dominated. Based 
on these arguments, we hypothesize that: 
H3: Low masculinity impacts positively on the number of women managers. 
Power Distance (PWD) 
 
Power distance. “Is the extent to which the members of a society accept that power in 
institutions and organizations is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1984 p.83). It creates a 
subordinate-superior relationship where subordinates have a heavy reliance on their superiors 
(Husted, 2000). Children in high power distance societies are taught to obey authorities whilst 
those in lower power distance countries are treated as equals and are able to question issues 
relating to inequalities (Hofstede, 1997). In high PWD cultures, important business decisions 
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are made by the rich and more powerful who consider their interests as paramount and the less 
powerful are very wary of contradicting authorities (Blodgett et al., 2001). PWD is thus 
conceptually related to Young (1990) “five faces of oppression” where the PWD cultural 
orientation becomes an imperialist culture so that actions that further the interests of the 
wealthy and the powerful become the norm whilst the powerless are placed such that they must 
take orders and seldom have the right to give them (Dubrosky, 2013; Young, 1990).  
Consequently, in terms of women representation in managerial positions high, PWD 
will impact both the demand and the supply sides. From the supply side to the extent that 
women in high PWD societies accept that power is unequally distributed and feel reluctant to 
challenge the status quo, they may be comfortable with non-managerial roles for two main 
reasons. First, they may be reluctant to challenge the sexual division of labour espoused in 
SRT. In this case, they may conform to the “homemaker” role stereotypically ascribed to them 
(Eagly & Wood, 1999). Thus, they are likely to accept the male gender as a manager prototype. 
Second, women in high PWD societies may be incentivised to accept and exhibit the communal 
attributes society ascribes to them. This will hinder them from exhibiting the “agentic” traits 
perceived to be a requirement to succeed in managerial roles. All these factors will reduce their 
willingness to offer themselves up for managerial positions which are perceived to be reserved 
for men (the supposed “breadwinners” with “agentic” features).  From the demand side, 
because inequalities are acceptable in high PWD cultures (Hofstede, 1984), discrimination 
against women is more likely to be acceptable and the women will refuse to question it. 
Therefore, the dominant male managers may be comfortable enforcing gender role stereotypes 
against them.  This will keep women in non-managerial roles and reduce their appointment to 
managerial positions which for a long time have been reserved for men. We, therefore, 
hypothesize that: 
H4: High power distance impacts negatively on the number of women managers. 
Page | 16  
 
Method and Data 
Data for this study are mainly from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) database. 
The MIX database hosts high-quality data on microfinance institutions (MFIs) around the 
world (Tchuigoua, 2016; Servin et al., 2012). MFIs reported by the MIX focus on a large 
number of MFI clients (Bogan, 2012). Unsurprisingly, the MIX data have recently been used 
extensively in several studies (Blanco-Oliver et al., 2016; Bogan, 2012; Servin et al., 2012; 
Tchuigoua, 2014; 2016; Wijesiri, 2016). We also collect country-level data from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) website. The final sample resulted in 2456 
unique MFIs across 61 countries (Appendix) over the period 2005-2015. 
 
Dependent variable 
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of national culture on managerial gender 
diversity. Specifically, the study seeks to examine how national cultural orientation may impact 
on women representation in the workforce at the managerial level. Previous gender diversity 
research either focus on the percentage of women on boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2009, Gul et 
al., 2011; Gyapong et al., 2016) or the fraction of women managers (Geiler & Renneboog, 
2015). However, since we focus on women managers we follow Geiler and Renneboog (2015) 
and use the fraction of women managers (MGRS).  
 
Main Independent Variables- National Culture 
Consistent with previous studies (Husted, 2000; Li et al., 2013) and as argued in section 3, we 
use the Hofstede cultural dimensions as proxies for national culture. More specifically, we 
focus on the four cultural dimensions (individualism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance 
and masculinity) espoused in Hofstede (1984). These scores are obtained from the results of 
the Hofstede psychological survey of IBM employees between 1967 and 1973. 
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Control Variables 
MFI-Specific Controls.  We control for several firm-level characteristics. We argue 
that the number of women managers may be influenced by the particular market being targeted 
by MFIs. For example, it is reasonable to expect MFIs that target low-end customers consisting 
mainly of women traders to have a higher number of women managers. MIX market puts the 
target market into four main categories, broad, small business, low-end and high-end. We 
control for this by including indicator variables for each of these categorizations. Further, we 
expect the number of women non-managers to affect the appointment of women managers. 
That is, ordinarily, MFIs with more women in non-managerial roles are likely to appoint 
women managers. To control for this, we use the percentage of women non-managers (F/Staff). 
More so, whether or not an MFI is operationally self-sufficient (OSS) may impact on the 
fraction of women managers. That is, whereas MFIs that are not operationally self-sufficient 
may be mainly guided by performance when making appointments and promotion decisions, 
operationally self-sufficient MFIs may simply make appointments and promotions based on 
other social considerations (such as the pursuance of a gender-equality objective) rather than 
performance. We, therefore, include an indicator variable to capture whether an MFI is 
operationally self-sufficient (OSS). We also control for MFI size (SIZE) as bigger MFIs are 
more likely to have more managers which may offer them the luxury of appointing women 
managers. 
 
Country-Specific Controls. A country’s level of economic development/growth affects how 
businesses are run (Chan & Cheung, 2012). We argue that the level of women participation in 
the workforce will be influenced by the level of real economic activity. We, therefore, control 
for the wealth of a country by including the GDP growth per capita (GDPgrt). Further, because 
MFIs belong to the financial sector it is envisaged that the level of financial sector development 
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may affect the fraction of women managers in particular. We, therefore, control for the level 
of financial sector development (FSD). More so, a major argument advanced for the lack of 
managerial gender diversity is a lack of qualified women (Gyapong et al., 2016). MFIs in 
countries with higher levels of female literacy are expected to have more women managers. 
We, therefore, control for the level of female literacy (Literacy) in the country where an MFI 
is located. Also, women in countries where laws mandate equal remuneration for both men and 
women may be incentivised to aspire for managerial roles. We, therefore, include a dummy 
variable (Law) equal to one for the existence of laws mandating equal remuneration for both 
men and women. All country-level variables were obtained from the World Bank (World 
Development Indicators). 
 
Method. The study utilises an unbalanced panel data that consist of several repeated 
observations hierarchically nested within firms that are hierarchically nested in countries. 
These present two major methodological issues. First, the three hierarchies in the data require 
an estimation technique that is able to deal with three levels of analyses. Second, the 
unbalanced nature of our data imply unequal block sizes and will involve the estimation of 
inter-block and intra-block weights that are not necessarily equal. Based on these constraints, 
we employ a hierarchical linear model (HLM) with residual maximum likelihood (REML). 
Our choice is based on two main reasons. 
First, HLM deals with statistical models and parameters that vary at more than one level 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). It is based on a Bayesian approach and effectively controls for 
different level effects (such as time, firm or country) by partitioning out the variance across 
these different levels of analyses (Erkan et al., 2017; Hoffmann, 1997; Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002). HLM allows for direct and simultaneous estimations at each level of analysis whilst 
holding other levels constant (Erkan et al., 2013; Hoffmann, 1997, Ozkaya et al., 2017). 
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Consequently, it alleviates concerns associated with the violation of independence that can bias 
standard errors in OLS estimates (Fong, 2010).  
Second, in balanced designs the fixed parameters are known, therefore the variance 
component can be efficiently estimated via the usual maximum likelihood (ML) approach 
because the blocks are of equal sizes (Nelder, 1968; Twisk, 2006). However, in unbalanced 
designs where the variances are random (Twisk, 2006) REML produces accurate estimates. 
This is because, the REML eliminate biases in unbalanced panels by dividing the mean squared 
deviation by the degrees of freedom instead of by sample size (Patterson & Thompson, 1971; 
Harville, 1977).  
 
The Econometric Specification. To test the effect of national culture on managerial gender 
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                  (Model 1) 
As additional analyses, we also examine the effect of national culture on non-managerial 
gender diversity, as well as how exposure to women non-managers affects culturally-embedded 
gender stereotypes.  
To examine the effect of national culture on non-managerial gender diversity we estimate the 
following hierarchical regression model: 
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To examine how the exposure to women non-managers affect culturally-embedded 
gender stereotypes we estimate the following hierarchical regression model: 
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Where:  
MGRSi,t = The fraction of women managers in MFI  i at time t. 
F/Staff = The fraction of women non-managers in MFI i at time t. 
Culturei,t = Uncertainty avoidance, Individualism, Masculinity and Power Distance for MFI i 
at time t. 
Zi,t = Matrix of MFI-specific controls such as fraction of women non-mangers (F/Staff), 
Operational self-sufficiency (OSS), Size (SIZE), target market dummies (TargetMkt), 
Ki,t= Matrix of controls that capture conditions in the country where the MFI is active. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Results  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Table 2 presents results for Pearson’s correlation matrix. Generally, the correlation matrix 
shows low correlations between the independent variables. We also evaluated multicollinearity 
using the variance inflation factor (VIF). The unreported results showed a mean VIF of 1.8 
with a maximum of 3.8. These indicate reduced multicollinearity. Interestingly, as 
hypothesised the correlation matrix shows that the fraction of women managers is negatively 
associated with all the four cultural variables. However, whereas uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism and masculinity have statistically significant associations with the fraction of 
women managers, power distance does not. 
Results for the descriptive statistics are also shown in Table 3. It indicates that MGRS 
has a mean of 0.11 and a standard deviation of 0.23. This indicates that on average 11.38% of 
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managerial seats are occupied by women. Similarly, F/Staff has a mean and standard deviation 
of 0.14 and 0.25 respectively. This implies that women constitute 14% of non-managerial staff. 
However, the mean for the fraction of women non-managers (14%) is greater than that of 
women managers (11%) suggesting that in relative terms, there are more women non-managers 
than women managers. Unsurprisingly, the mean of MGRS (0.11) and F/Staff (0.14) are higher 
than the median (MGRS= 0.00; F/Staff= 0.00). This indicates that they are positively skewed. 
Impliedly, a greater number of the sampled MFIs appoint fewer women managers and women 
staff with very few MFIs having a higher number of women staff and women managers. For 
the control variables, we find that 21% of the sampled MFIs are operationally self-sufficient 
(OSS) whilst 35.2% are located in countries with laws that mandate equal remuneration for 
both men and women (Law). Further, countries in the sample have an average GDP growth per 
capita (GDPgrt) of 3.57%. Also, financial sector development (FSD) and size (SIZE) have 
means of 35.31, and 15.64 respectively. 
In terms of the cultural variables, power distance has the highest mean (74.21) followed 
by uncertainty avoidance (61.01) before masculinity (51.97). Further, Individualism has the 
lowest mean of the four cultural variables (25.81). These results indicate that most of the 
countries in the sample are collective societies with high power distance and a moderate 
appetite for uncertainty. Given that most MFIs are located in developing countries (Strom et 
al., 2014) which are mainly collectivist societies with high power distance, the result is not 
surprising.  
[INSERT TABLE 2&3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Regression Results 
Culture and Managerial Gender Diversity. Table 4 presents results for the HLM 
analyses used to test the hypotheses. This table presents regression estimates for model 1. 
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Column  1 only includes the control variables and column 2  tests the hypotheses. In line with 
HLM procedures, the measure of model fit is reported in the form of a likelihood ratio test (LR) 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The LR ratio provides a comparison of the fully unrestricted 
models with no predictors with their respective more complex models (Fong, 2010). As evident 
in Table 4, the LR test statistics Chi-square is significant across all the models. 
 The results in column 1 show the effects of the control variables on managerial gender 
diversity. Interestingly, the existence of laws mandating gender pay equality (Law) has no 
statistically significant relationship with the fraction of women managers (P-value>0.1). 
Similarly, the level of female literacy (literacy) does not influence the appointment of women 
managers (P-value>0.1). These suggest that gender pay-equality laws and high female literacy 
rates do not improve managerial gender diversity. The results for the full regression (including 
the hypothesised variables) are shown in column 2.  It indicates that uncertainty avoidance 
(Uncert) impacts negatively on the fraction of women managers (P-value< 0.01). This result 
supports H1 and indicates that fewer women managers are appointed in high uncertainty 
avoidance societies. More so, the results in Table 4 (column 2) show that individualism exhibit 
a negative and statistically significant relationship with the fraction of women managers (P-
value<0.01). This also supports H2, which states that individualistic societies have fewer 
women managers. Further, masculinity has a positive relationship with the fraction of women 
managers but the relationship is not statistically significant (P-value> 0.1). This indicates that 
the masculinity cultural orientation does not affect managers’ decision to appoint women 
managers, thus H3 is not supported. Again, power distance has a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with the fraction of women managers (P-value<0.01). This finding is 
in contrast to H4 and suggests that the fraction of women managers is high in high power 
distance societies. Given that corporate gender diversity is a corporate governance issue (Ntim, 
2015) the results contradict the findings of Chan and Cheung (2015) who reported a negative 
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relationship between power distance and corporate governance. Nevertheless, Hofstede (2001) 
suggests that people in high power distance societies are taught to obey authorities without 
questioning. Therefore, with the advent of SRT that suggests role play according to sexes 
(Eagly et al., 2001), it could be that PWD impact negatively on women representation at a 
different level in the organization. We explore the possibility that high PWD legitimizes sex 
roles by preventing women participation at lower levels in the organisation (non-managerial 
roles).   
 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Further Analysis 
Culture and Non-Managerial Gender Diversity 
Existing studies on gender stereotypes mainly focus on women managers (Geiler & 
Renneboog, 2015) or board members (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Liu et al., 2014) and thus 
assume that gender stereotype is evident when women are unable to climb up the corporate 
ladder. However, although, women’s labour force participation rates are as high as 67% in 
China and 57.5% in the USA (Chen et al., 2014), they are as low as 16% and 15% in 
Afghanistan and Algeria (World Bank, 2014) respectively. Impliedly, culturally-embedded 
gender stereotypes generally affect women participation in the workforce and not only at the 
top level.  
We explore the extent to which national culture affects women participation in the 
workforce albeit at the non-managerial level by running model 2. The result is presented in 
Table 5. It shows that although uncertainty avoidance (Uncert) has a positive relationship with 
the fraction of women non-managers (F/Staff), the relationship is not statistically significant. 
This suggests that women representation at non-managerial levels is not a source of uncertainty 
or ambiguity so that even in high uncertainty avoidance societies, women representation at 
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lower levels of the organisation is not restrained. In contrast, individualism (Indiv) impacts 
negatively on women representation at non-managerial levels (F/Staff) and the relationship is 
statistically significant (P-value<0.01). Further, results in Table 5 indicate that masculinity 
(Masc) has a positive and statistically significant relationship with women in non-managerial 
positions (F/Staff) (P-value<0.01). This suggests that the masculinity cultural orientation 
increases the appointment of women into non-managerial roles. Interestingly, power distance 
has a negative and statistically significant relationship with the fraction of women at the non-
managerial level (F/Staff) (P-value<0.05). 
 [INSER TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Mere Exposure Effect and Culturally-Embedded Gender Stereotypes.  
The mere exposure hypothesis suggests that people’s attitudes are enhanced by merely 
exposing them to a stimulus or an object (Zajonc, 1968). Exposing people to stimulus, object 
or group leads to increases in “experienced familiarity” and then “increased liking” (Becker & 
Rinck, 2016).  In fact, mere exposure can non-consciously alter people’s perception of a group 
in their community and causes them to feel connected to others in their society (Kwan et al., 
2015). Investors have special preferences for investments that they have been previously 
exposed to (Cao et al., 2009) because merely exposing customers to a product, or a brand name 
increases the consumer’s favourable attitude towards the brand (Janiszewski, 1993). For 
example, to reduce gender stereotypes against women in business, the dean of Harvard 
Business School proposes doubling the rate of female protagonists in business cases (Patel, 
2014). There is also evidence of a drastic reduction in biases at the random exposure to women 
colleagues (Finseraas et al., 2016), and to black females in colleges (Boisjoly et al., 2006).  
Beaman et al. (2009) investigated the effect of the mere exposure effect on Indian 
villagers who had a preference for male leaders. They reported that exposure to women leaders 
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weakens stereotypes about gender roles and concluded that mere exposure can “successfully 
alter social norms or perceptions”. We argue that the mere exposure effect can successfully 
alter culturally embedded norms and perceptions. Therefore, ceteres paribus, exposure to 
women non-managers4 may change how culturally embedded stereotypes affect the 
appointment of women managers. For example, there may be fewer women managers in high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures because their presence may result in uncertainty and ambiguity. 
However, after their entry into the workforce, male managers may become exposed to them 
and become familiar with their skills and abilities. Their presence may thus cease to be a source 
of ambiguity and uncertainty in high Uncert cultures. This may enable them to rise to the 
highest level in the organization. We examine how exposure to women subordinates affects the 
appointment of women managers in different cultures.  
To do this we run Model 3. The results are presented in Table 6. Column 1 presents the 
results for the Uncert-F/Staff interaction (Uncert*F/Staff). It indicates that the Uncert-F/Staff 
interaction has a positive and statistically significant relationship with MGRS (P-value<0.01). 
The findings suggest that increasing the number of women in non-managerial roles in high 
Uncert cultures reduces the uncertainty and ambiguity associated with women manager 
appointments. Column 2 presents results for the interaction of F/Staff and Indiv (Indiv*F/Staff). 
The results show that the interaction of Indiv and F/Staff is negatively related to MGRS (P-
value<0.01). Results in column 2 also indicate a negative and statistically significant effect of 
Indiv on MGRS (P-value<0.01). These results imply that fewer women managers are appointed 
in high individualistic societies, and exposure to women subordinates does not reduce the 
discriminatory attitudes against women in these societies. The findings of this study suggest 
that the mere exposure effect does not reduce the glass ceiling against women in individualistic 
societies. Further, Column 3 shows that the interaction of Masc and F/Staff (Masc*F/Staff) has 
no statistically significant relationship with MGRS (P-value>0.1). Also, Masc has a positive 
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relationship with MGRS but the relationship is not statistically. These findings indicate that the 
masculinity cultural orientation does not influence women manager appointments and this 
relationship is unaffected by the number of women subordinates. Lastly, column 4 presents 
results for the PWD-F/Staff interaction (PWD*F/Staff). It shows that the interaction of PWD 
and F/Staff impacts positively on MGRS and the relationship is statistically significant (P-
value<0.01). This implies that exposure to women subordinates in high power distance 
societies increases the fraction of women managers.  Further, PWD remains positive but not 
statistically significant in column 4 (P-value>0.1) indicating that in the absence of women 
subordinates, high power distance has no effect on the fraction of women managers.  
Overall, the findings indicate that the mere exposure effect has no influence on how 
culturally embedded attitudes impact women manager appointments in high masculine (Masc) 
societies. Conversely, the mere exposure effect reduces (increases) the fraction of women 
managers in high individualistic (power distance and uncertainty avoidance) societies. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Robustness Test: Endogeneity 
The Hausman-Taylor Estimator 
Our studies examine the effect of national culture on managerial gender diversity in MFIs. 
Nevertheless, culture and managerial gender diversity may be endogenously related (through 
reverse causality, omitted variable bias etc). Therefore, following Oh et al. (2016) we adopt the 
Hausman-Taylor estimator (Hausman & Taylor, 1981) to deal with endogeneity. The 
Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator is an instrumental variable estimator that uses both the within 
and between variation of the strictly exogenous variables as instruments (Baltagi et al., 2003). 
Specifically, it uses the individual means of the strictly exogenous regressors as instruments 
for the time-invariant regressors that are correlated with the individual effects (Baltagi, 2001).  
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The HT estimator removes biases in parameter estimates arising from endogenous unobserved 
effects by specifying different subsets of variables that were assumed to be endogenous (Oh et 
al., 2016).  
The results of the HT estimator are shown in Table 7. Consistent with the HLM 
regressions, column 2 shows that uncertainty avoidance and individualism impact negatively 
on the fraction of women managers. Similarly, masculinity exhibits no statistically significant 
relationship while power distance has a positive and statistically significant relationship with 
the fraction of women managers. Also, results for the mere exposure effect (as displayed in 
columns 3-6) are consistent with the HLM regressions. These indicate that overall, our results 
are robust to endogeneity concerns.  
 
Further Tests 
We conduct further tests to ascertain the robustness of our results. First, although the results of 
the correlation matrix indicate no serious multicollinearity we note that theoretically, it may be 
possible to infer a correlation between some of the cultural variables. We thus re-run all our 
regressions by including the cultural variables separately. The unreported results show that our 
results remain qualitatively similar. Further, our analyses excluded two of the Hofstede cultural 
variables (long-term orientation and indulgence) because these were missing for most countries 
in our sample. However, we included these in a different set of regressions and our results 
remained qualitatively similar. Lastly, almost 10% of the sampled MFIs are from India raising 
the possibility that the India sample could drive the results. We, therefore, re-run all our 
regressions by excluding the Indian sample. The unreported results are qualitatively similar to 
all our previous results indicating that our results are not blurred by the India sample.  
 
Discussion, Limitations and Future Directions 
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The results show that workplace gender diversity is a function of national cultural orientation. 
More specifically, although uncertainty avoidance and individualism reduce the appointment 
of women managers, masculinity has no effect on managerial gender diversity. In contrast, 
power distance increases managerial gender diversity. The results also indicate that while fewer 
women non-managers are employed in societies high on power distance and individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance has no effect on the participation of women in non-managerial roles. 
However, in high masculine societies, higher numbers of women are employed in non-
managerial roles. Interestingly, in societies high on uncertainty avoidance and power distance, 
increasing the number of women non-managers results in higher numbers of women managers. 
On the contrary, in high masculine societies, a higher number of women in non-managerial 
roles reduces the appointment of women managers. These findings offer several contributions. 
First, the study offers an empirical contribution. The fact that studies on the relationship 
between ownership structure and the appointment of women to managerial positions have 
produced mixed results leave researchers to seek an explanation for such findings. For example, 
Martin-Ugedo and Minguez-Vera (2014) report a positive (negative) and statistically 
significant relationship between family (corporate) ownership and corporate gender diversity 
in Spain. In contrast, the findings of Saeed et al. (2016) indicate that family ownership has no 
effect on workplace gender diversity in Russia and Brazil. One explanation for the mixed 
results could be that relative to Russia and Brazil, daughters of wealthy business families in 
Spain may be relatively educated and are able to assume managerial roles in the family 
business. Alternatively, it could be that shareholders’ decision to favour or oppose women 
manager appointments are influenced by their cultural environment. Our study follows the 
logic of Scott (1995) and argues that different classes of ownership may have an effect on the 
appointment of women managers, but the direction may depend on cultural factors that 
surround their societies and grant them legitimacy. For example, owners in countries with a 
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cultural heritage that promote the advancement of women in the workplace, are more likely to 
champion the appointment of women managers to gain societal legitimacy. On the contrary, 
shareholders from cultures that do not support the advancement of women in the workplace 
may support conservative decisions that will result in managerial gender homogeneity. We test 
how different national cultural orientation affects the advancement of women to managerial 
roles. We find that uncertainty avoidance and individualistic societies oppose the appointment 
of women managers while masculinity has no effect.  On the contrary, high power distance 
societies encourage the appointment of women into managerial roles. To the extent that people 
make decisions cognisant of their legitimacy implications (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995), the 
study contributes to the literature by documenting that culturally-entrenched beliefs of various 
stakeholders including shareholders may influence their women managerial appointment 
decisions.  
Second, the study has practical implications for managers and regulators. The debate 
over workplace gender diversity has attracted global attention. In response regulators in several 
countries including Norway, Sweden, Spain, Australia, the UK and Germany instituted either 
a mandatory gender quota or a recommendation requiring firms to increase women 
representation in managerial positions. In the US, California recently introduced a mandatory 
gender quota. Also in 2017, the UK supplemented their gender recommendation with a gender 
pay-gap act. This Act aims to increase workplace gender diversity by reducing pay-gaps 
between men and women. Nevertheless, questions have been raised about whether gender 
quota is expedient. For example, Bohren and Staubo (2014) question the effectiveness of 
mandatory gender quotas at the board level and suggest that firms change organizational form 
to circumvent board upheaval.  
The results show that in countries high on uncertainty avoidance as well as those in 
high power distance, merely increasing the number of women in non-managerial roles results 
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in increases in the number of women managers. Impliedly, in these cultures, exposure to 
women at lower levels of the organisation alter culturally-embedded norms, weaken 
stereotypes about gender roles and augurs well for women managerial appointments. This view 
is consistent with arguments in the social psychology literature (Beama et al., 2009; Becker & 
Rinck, 2016; Cao et al., 2009; Zajonc, 1968) that attitudes are enhanced by exposure. 
Moreover, the fact that women non-managers are able to assume managerial roles in these 
cultures indicates that managerial gender homogeneity in these societies is not due to unfair 
discrimination against women employees. This obviates the need for mandatory gender quota 
aimed at reducing gender-based inequalities at the workplace that hinder the progress of 
women. Therefore, we suggest that policymakers in societies high on power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance focus on increasing women’s participation in the workforce (in non-
managerial roles) which is far easier to do than compelling firms to appoint women into critical 
managerial roles.  
The result also shows that increasing the number of women non-managers in high 
individualistic societies reduces the number of women managers, and has no effect on the 
appointment of women managers in high masculine societies. The fact that a higher number of 
women in non-managerial roles does not encourage more women manager appointments 
implies that governments and policymakers in countries high on individualism and masculinity 
may need to adopt an alternative approach rather than merely increasing the number of women 
non-managers if they are to reduce managerial gender homogeneity. In these countries, we 
recommend the use of gender legislation, quotas and recommendations to increase managerial 
gender diversity. These imply that a consideration of national culture may provide a nuanced 
regulatory response to increasing managerial gender diversity. 
Third, important theoretical contributions are offered. Social role theory suggests that 
society establishes a sexual division of labour where masculine behaviours prevail in work 
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situations and feminine behaviours in social situations (Eagly & Wood, 199; Yockey, 1978). 
Consequently, men and women exhibit traits reminiscent of these stereotypical gender role 
ascriptions making it atypical for women to succeed in the workplace. SRT, therefore, offers 
credible explanations for workplace gender homogeneity. Nevertheless, within SRT, what is 
not clear is whether there are inter-societal differences in gender role beliefs. If as demonstrated 
in previous studies (Adams & Ferrera 2009; Gyapong et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2014), different 
societies have different levels of managerial gender diversity, then this may be because 
different societies place a different level of emphasis on gender role stereotypes 
This study theorizes that culture influences workplace gender diversity through its 
effect on the extent to which societies uphold the stereotypical ascription of gender roles. SRT 
argues that men and women perform different roles in society where men are “breadwinners 
and women are “homemakers” (Eagly & Wood, 1999). Similarly, Hofstede (1984) opines that 
people in high uncertainty avoidance societies are conservative and are apt to uphold the status 
quo and avoid ambiguity and uncertainty. In consonance with this, our results suggest that high 
uncertainty avoidance impacts negatively on the fraction of women managers. Thus, the 
appointment of women into managerial roles is a source of ambiguity and uncertainty since it 
implies that women become “breadwinners” contrary to their “homemaker” role. Therefore, 
drawing on SRT, we interpret the results to mean that to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity, 
managers in high uncertainty avoidance societies uphold traditional gender role stereotypes 
and thus become intolerant to the appointment of women managers. Alternatively, given that 
SRT stereotypically ascribes “homemaker” roles to women the findings may be because 
women in high uncertainty avoidance countries regard managerial roles as atypical to their 
gender and avoid it because it represents uncertainty and ambiguity. The results indicate that 
uncertainty avoidance societies place greater emphasis on traditional gender stereotypes 
leading to increased managerial gender homogeneity. 
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Further, Hofstede (1984) suggests that individualistic societies are egoistic, self-centred 
and selfish. Our results complement this by suggesting that fewer women managers are 
appointed in individualistic societies. Thus, managerial positions in most companies are male-
dominated and the gender stereotypes argued in SRT favour men. Consequently, individualistic 
male managers demonstrate selfishness and self-centeredness by upholding these gender 
stereotypes against women resulting in the appointment of fewer women managers.  However, 
we do not find statistically significant results for the effects of masculinity on the fraction of 
women managers. This indicates that high masculine societies neither emphasize nor downplay 
stereotypical gender roles against women.  
More so, the findings suggest that power distance impact negatively (positively) on the 
fraction of women non-managers (managers). In high power distance cultures, society accepts 
the unequal distribution of power (Hofstede, 1984), and the interests of the most powerful are 
paramount whilst the less powerful accept inequalities (Blodgett et al., 2011). The findings, 
therefore, indicate that high power distance legitimises the sexual division of labour argued in 
SRT, leading to the appointment of fewer women into non-managerial roles. Nevertheless, the 
few women that make it to non-managerial roles are able to challenge the status quo, lessen the 
effects of gender stereotypes and increase their presence in managerial positions. Overall, 
drawing on the societal lens, the results indicate that although gender role stereotype-shared 
expectations reduce (increase) the appointment of women managers in societies high on 
uncertainty avoidance and individualism (Power distance), it has no effect in high masculine 
societies. This study thus contributes to a better understanding of how the gender role 
stereotypes argued in SRT may vary across countries and societies with different cultural 
orientation.  
The study has some limitations. First, similar to other related studies (Galego-Alvarez 
& Ortas, 2017; Graafland & Noorderhaven, 2018; Husted, 2000; Li et al., 2013; Song et al., 
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2018) our study uses the Hofstede (1984) original four cultural dimensions. Focusing on the 
four dimensions bring in its trail two major advantages. First, prior studies (Hodwick, 2011; 
Fang, 2003; Eringa et al., 2015) suggest that the new two dimensions (long-term orientation 
and indulgence) are related to several attributes of the original four dimensions, hence their 
omission help mitigate potential multicollinearity issues. Second, the high popularity and usage 
of the Hofstede cultural dimensions relative to the GLOBE cultural indices improve results 
comparability. Nevertheless, a contrary view is that the GLOBE study is more recent and with 
nine different cultural dimensions, it provides a fine-grained approach to measuring national 
culture. Future studies could focus on the GLOBE cultural indices. Second, our study uses data 
on MFIs which are mainly located in developing countries. While this provides important 
evidence on managerial gender diversity, generalizability may be limited due to the focus on 
developing countries. Future studies may explore developed countries where advancement and 
modernisation may weaken the grip of local culture. Third, India has the highest number of 
firms in our sample. However, given that India is a big country with huge cultural variations 
across regions care should be taken when generalizing our results with respect to India. 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, this study examines how different dimensions of national culture account of 
inter-country differences in managerial gender diversity. The article is premised on the 
argument that managerial gender homogeneity is a function of the sexual division of labour 
that encourages men and women to value and exhibit different traits. Thus, there is a societal 
perception that men exhibit “agentic” features while women exhibit communal features. 
However, society views the “agentic” features attributed to men as important for a manager 
prototype because it involves features such as assertiveness and confidence. This leads to the 
appointment of a few women managers.  By extension, the results suggest that the extent to 
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which this gender role stereotype may increase managerial gender homogeneity is subject to 
whether local culture upholds or opposes this perception. For example, people in high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures are wary of opposing this perception and as such tend to appoint 
fewer women managers. Nevertheless, increasing the number of women non-managers in high 
uncertainty avoidance societies reduces this perception and increases women manager 
appointments. On the contrary, individualistic societies uphold gender role stereotypes and 
appoint fewer women managers regardless of the number of women non-managers. Further, 
societies high on masculinity neither uphold nor oppose these gender stereotypes and as such 
does not affect the appointment of women managers irrespective of the number of women in 
non-managerial positions. Interestingly, high power distance societies oppose (uphold) these 
gender stereotypes against the appointment of women managers (non-managers). As a result 
more (less) women managers (women non-managers) are appointed in high power distance 
cultures. However, increasing the number of women non-managers increases the appointment 
of women managers in these societies. The findings imply that national culture is an important 
determinant of workplace gender diversity. Although regulators and businesses have adopted 
a “one size fit all” approach to reducing workplace gender homogeneity, our results suggest 
that contrasting approaches cognisant of national cultural orientation may be effective in 
increasing managerial gender diversity.  
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1 The few studies (Bobbit-Zeher, 2011; Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Glicke & Fiske, 2007; Gorman, 2005) that 
examine the causes of workplace gender discrimination focus on how gender stereotyping and organizational 
factors contribute to discrimination against women. However, although the findings of these studies are useful, 
they do not address why these gender stereotyping and organizational factors that discriminate against women at 
the workplace exist, as well as why they are more prevalent in some societies relative to others. 
 
2 In this article, we use the words “culture” and “national culture” interchangeably to refer to national culture. 
 
3 Several countries around the world are calling on firms to increase the number of women managers and directors. 
For example, Norway signed a law requiring firms to increase the number of female directors to 40% by 2008. 
Similarly, Iceland, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium have introduced various quotas to 
facilitate managerial and board gender diversity. In the USA, California introduced a bill in 2018 that requires 
firms to increase the number of women in top positions. Others including the UK, Australia, New Zealand etc. 
have introduced voluntary recommendations that encourage firms to appoint more women into top management. 
 
4 Prior studies mainly focus on peer-to-peer exposure (Finseraas et al., 2016; Boisjoly, et al., 2006). However, we 
focus on subordinates-to-superior exposure for two main reasons. First, the global call for gender diversity is 
premised on the argument that there are too many female subordinates but male-dominated managers. 
Consequently, a focus on subordinate-to-superior exposure is necessary to capture how culture either inhibit or 
prohibit the ‘many female subordinates but fewer female managers’ problem. Second, existing studies suggest 
that most firms either do not have women in managerial positions or just appoint “token” women (Kanter, 1977; 
Carter et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2014; Gyapong et al., 2016). However, the critical mass theory suggests that women 
need a critical mass to make the desired impact (Kristie, 2011). Therefore, we believe that the mere exposure 
effect is best captured at the lower level of the organization where women are more likely to have a critical mass.  
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Variable Description and Definitions 
Variable Proxy Description Source 
Dependent Variable 
 
MGRS Fraction of women 
managers 
Number of women managers expressed as a fraction of 
total managers. 
MIX Market 
Main Independent Variables 
 
Uncert Uncertainty Avoidance The Uncertainty-avoidance dimension expresses the 
degree to which the members of a society feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. The 
country mean scores from the survey questions are used 
to form an index that range between 0 and 100. Higher 
scores represent a higher level in that specific dimension. 
The method in calculating the culture scores are similar 




Indiv Individualism Individualism is defined as a preference for a loosely-
knit social framework in which individuals are expected 





Masc Masculinity The Masculinity side of this dimension represents a 
preference in society for achievement, heroism, 




PWD Power Distance This dimension expresses the degree to which the less 
powerful members of a society accept and expect that 






F/Staff Fraction of women non-
managers 
Number of women non-managers expressed as a 
fraction of total non-managers staff 
MIX Market 
OSS Operational Self 
Sufficiency  
= {(Operating revenue)/ (financial expense+ loan-loss 
provision expense + operating expense)} 
 
An indicator variable equal to “1” if an MFI  has 
OSS>= “1” otherwise  “0” 
MIX Market 
SIZE Total Assets Natural logarithm of total assets  
{Ln(total assets)} 
MIX Market 
TargetMkt Target Market Dummies Indicator variables for four target markets classified as 
broad, small business, low-end and high-end. 
MIX Market 
GDPgrt Gross Domestic 
Product Growth per 
Capita 
The rate of GDP per capita growth. World 
Development 
Indicators 
FSD Financial Sector 
Development 
Domestic credit by the financial sector. Includes 
all credit to various sectors. The financial sector 
includes monetary authorities and deposit money 




Law Remuneration law. An indicator variable equal to “1” for whether there is a 
law that obligates employers to pay equal remuneration 
to male and women employees who do work of equal 




Literacy Female Literacy The percentage of female aged 15 and above who can 
both read and write with understanding a short simple 
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Table 2. 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
              
MGRS 1 1 
           
Uncert    2 -0.02+ 1 
          
Indiv 3 -0.07+ -0.42+ 1 
         
Masc 4 -0.02+ -0.09+ 0.26+ 1 
        
PWD 5 -0.00 -0.21+ 0.07+ 0.40+ 1 
       
Law 6 0.02+ 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.03+ 1 
      
Literacy 7 0.00 -0.05+ -0.02+ 0.02 -0.00 0.24+ 1 
     
FSD 8 0.20+ -0.25+ 0.32+ -0.15+ -0.11+ -0.00 0.01 1 
    
OSS 9 0.02+ 0.12+ -0.06+ 0.00 -0.04+ -0.05+ -0.20+ -0.03+ 1 
   
F/Staff 10 0.45+ 0.02+ -0.07+ -0.01 -0.03+ 0.01 -0.00 0.19+ 0.04+ 1 
  
GDPgrt 11 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02+ 0.05+ 0.08+ 0.09+ 0.01 -0.10+ 0.00 1 
 
Size 12 0.04+ 0.19+ -0.05+ 0.10+ 0.02+ -0.00 0.00 0.05+ 0.07+ 0.09+ 0.02 1 
 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation coefficients of the variables used in the regressions. The national culture variables include uncertainty 
avoidance (Uncert), individualism (Indiv), Masculinity (Masc) and power distance (PWD). The other variables include the fraction of women managers 
(MGRS), existence of gender pay-gap law (Law), female literacy (Literacy), financial sector development (FSD), operational sell-sufficiency(OSS), target 
market(TargetMarket), the fraction of women non-managers (F/staff), GDP growth per capita (GDPgrt) and MFI size (Size). + indicates a 2-tailed statistical 
significance at the 5% level. 
  







 Full Sample  With MGRS  Without MGRS 
  Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th 95th  Mean Std. Dev  Mean Std. Dev 
              
MGRS  0.11 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.66       
Uncert  61.01 18.27 44.00 55.00 80.00 90.00  59.04 18.63  61.79 18.07 
Indiv  25.81 12.33 15.00 25.00 32.00 48.00  25.81 13.25  25.81 11.95 
Masc  51.97 11.05 42.00 55.00 63.00 69.00  52.03 10.64  51.95 11.20 
PWD  74.21 10.76 69.00 77.00 80.00 94.00  74.24 10.25  74.19 10.95 
Law  0.352 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00  0.36 0.48  0.34 0.47 
Literacy  77.92 20.95 62.98 82.91 93.81 99.73  78.48 20.58  77.69 21.09 
FSD  35.31 19.11 22.81 29.54 44.82 70.45  40.96 21.86  33.34 17.64 
OSS  0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.25 0.43  0.20 0.40 
F/Staff  0.14 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.69  0.43 26.00  0.02 12.26 
GDPgrt  3.57 3.32 2.03 3.57 5.05 7.79  3.46 3.32  3.61 3.31 
Size  15.64 2.15 14.27 15.54 17.02 19.38  16.35 1.96  15.37 2.15 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions. The national culture variables include 
uncertainty avoidance (Uncert), individualism (Indiv), Masculinity (Masc) and power distance (PWD). The other variables 
include the fraction of women managers (MGRS), existence of gender pay-gap law (Law), female literacy (Literacy), financial 
sector development (FSD), operational sell-sufficiency(OSS), target market(TargetMarket), the fraction of women non-
managers (F/staff), GDP growth per capita (GDPgrt) and MFI size (Size).  




This table presents hierarchical linear regression model for the effects of national culture on the fraction 
of women managers.  The dependent variable is the fraction of women managers (MGRS). The national 
culture variables include uncertainty avoidance (Uncert), individualism (Indiv), Masculinity (Masc) and 
power distance (PWD). The control variables include existence of gender pay-gap law (Law), female 
literacy (Literacy), financial sector development (FSD), operational sell-sufficiency(OSS), target 
market(TargetMarket), the fraction of women non-managers (F/staff), GDP growth per capita (GDPgrt) 
and MFI size (Size). The residual maximum likelihood is employed in all regression. Unstandardized 
coefficients are reported. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
  
Table 4 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions of Culture and Managerial Gender Diversity 
 
  (1)   (2)            
MGRS 
                  














Literacy   
FSD   
OSS   
F/Staff   
GDPgrt   
SIZE   
TargetMarket  YES  YES 








Indiv     
Masc     
PWD     





Wald  χ2   
LR χ2   
N   
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Table 5 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions of Culture and Non-Managerial Gender Diversity 
 
  (1)           (2)  
 F/Staff 
       
Law  0.518   0.410  
Literacy  0.000   -0.010  
FSD  0.240***   0.325***  
OSS  3.598***   2.569***  
GDPgrt  0.020   0.014  
TargetMarket  YES  YES 
SIZE  1.062***   0.799***  
Uncert                 0.0236  
Indiv                 -0.336***  
Masc                 0.186***  
PWD                 -0.0736**  
Constant  2.259***   2.229***  
Wald  χ2  410***   586***  
LR χ2  218.03***   204.41***  
N  7007               7007  
 
This table presents hierarchical linear regression model for the effects of national culture on the fraction 
of women non-managers.  The dependent variable is the fraction of women non-managers (F/Staff). 
The national culture variables include uncertainty avoidance (Uncert), individualism (Indiv), 
Masculinity (Masc) and power distance (PWD). The control variables include existence of gender pay-
gap law (Law), female literacy (Literacy), financial sector development (FSD), operational sell-
sufficiency (OSS), target market (TargetMarket) GDP growth per capita (GDPgrt) and MFI size (Size). 
The residual maximum likelihood is employed in all regression. Unstandardized coefficients are 
reported. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 6 
Hierarchical Linear Regressions of Mere Exposure Effect and the Culture- Managerial Gender 
Diversity Relationship 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MGRS 
      
Law  0.593 0.687 0.638 0.646 
Literacy  0.003 0.004 0.0042 0.005 
FSD  0.079*** 0.082*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 
OSS  -0.117 -0.264 -0.136 -0.246 
F/Staff  0.829*** 0.758*** 0.733*** 0.447*** 
GDPgrt  -0.034 -0.026 -0.029 -0.037 
SIZE  -0.275*** -0.273*** -0.262*** -0.287***  
TargetMarket  YES YES YES YES 
Uncert   -0.010 -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.043*** 
Indiv  -0.092*** -0.063** -0.104*** -0.099*** 
Masc  0.004 0.002 0.019 0.010 
PWD  0.054*** 0.052** 0.052*** 0.001 
Uncert*F/Staff   0.002***    
Indiv*F/Staff   -0.002***                 
Masc*F/Staff    -0.001                
PWD*F/Staff     0.003*** 
Constant  1.557 2.691 2.788 7.342**  
Wald  χ2  9193*** 9130*** 9098*** 9165.24*** 
LR χ2  49.91*** 55.39*** 57.48*** 53.15*** 
N  7007 7007 7007 7007 
 
This table presents hierarchical linear regression model for the mere exposure effects of the culture-
managerial gender diversity relationship. The dependent variable is the fraction of women managers 
(MGRS). The national culture variables include uncertainty avoidance (Uncert), individualism (Indiv), 
Masculinity (Masc) and power distance (PWD). The control variables include existence of gender pay-
gap law (Law), female literacy (Literacy), financial sector development (FSD), operational sell-
sufficiency (OSS), target market (TargetMarket) the fraction of women non-managers (F/staff), GDP 
growth per capita (GDPgrt) and MFI size (Size). The residual maximum likelihood is employed in all 
regression. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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This table presents results from the Hausman Taylor estimation. The dependent variable is the fraction of women 
managers (MGRS). The national culture variables include uncertainty avoidance (Uncert), individualism (Indiv), 
Masculinity (Masc) and power distance (PWD). The control variables include existence of gender pay-gap law 
(Law), female literacy (Literacy), financial sector development (FSD), operational sell-sufficiency (OSS), target 
market (TargetMarket) the fraction of women non-managers (F/staff), GDP growth per capita (GDPgrt) and MFI 
size (Size). The residual maximum likelihood is employed in all regression. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All variables are as 





Endogeneity- Hausman Taylor Estimation 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MGRS 
        
Law  0.715 0.797* 0.754 0.809* 0.791* 0.771 
Literacy  0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
FSD  0.074*** 0.090*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 
OSS  0.495 0.337 0.298 0.324 0.342 0.218 
F/Staff   0.688*** 0.685*** 0.786*** 0.717*** 0.716*** 0.455*** 
GDPgrt  0.020 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.003 
SIZE  -0.266*** -0.253*** -0.261*** -0.257*** -0.256*** -0.278*** 
TargetMarket  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Uncert   -0.038*** -0.014 -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
Indiv   -0.097*** -0.088*** -0.078*** -0.094*** -0.091*** 
Masc   0.009 0.005 0.004 0.013 0.007 
PWD   0.049** 0.051*** 0.049** 0.050** 0.001 
Uncert*F/Staff    0.002***                  
Indiv*F/Staff     -0.001*                 
Masc*F/Staff       -0.000                
PWD*F/Staff       0.003*** 
Constant  -76.3 -30.5 -19.61 -31.72 -20.16 -12.11 
Wald  χ2  6116*** 6313.63*** 8626.16*** 8311.96*** 8857.71*** 9096.32*** 
N  7007 7007 7007 7007 7007 7007 
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Appendix 1 
List of Countries 
 
No Country Firms  No Country Firms 
1 Afghanistan 17  31 Iraq 11 
2 Argentina 16  32 Kazakhstan 36 
3 Armenia 14  33 Kenya 36 
4 Azerbaijan 39  34 Kosovo 12 
5 Bangladesh 51  35 Kyrgyzstan 43 
6 Benin 30  36 Laos 30 
7 Bolivia 25  37 Madagascar 16 
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 13  38 Mali 21 
9 Brazil 39  39 Mexico 106 
10 Bulgaria 26  40 Mongolia 12 
11 Burkina Faso 28  41 Morocco 10 
12 Burundi 22  42 Nepal 44 
13 Cambodia 20  43 Nicaragua 32 
14 Cameroon 26  44 Niger 17 
15 China, People's Republic of 67  45 Nigeria 75 
16 Colombia 39  46 Pakistan 34 
17 Congo, Democratic Republic  24  47 Palestine 11 
18 Costa Rica 18  48 Peru 63 
19 Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 26  49 Philippines 90 
20 Dominican Republic 13  50 Russia 118 
21 Ecuador 68  51 Rwanda 43 
22 Egypt 16  52 Senegal 73 
23 El Salvador 19  53 Sierra Leone 11 
24 Ethiopia 25  54 Sri Lanka 23 
25 Georgia 15  55 Tajikistan 45 
26 Ghana 69  56 Tanzania 22 
27 Guatemala 26  57 Togo 32 
28 Honduras 26  58 Uganda 27 
29 India 201  59 Uzbekistan 33 
30 Indonesia 48  60 Vietnam 40 
    61 Yemen 10 
      2456 
 
 
 
 
